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INTRODUCTION
During 1980 the Panel, as in the past, has assigned
areas of interest to its members. These specific people
are responsible for the fact-finding in a given area
and at times enlist the aid of other members to help them.
As a part of our regULarLy scheduled fact-finding sessions,
we have time to discuss the various facts that the members
have ascertained so we can develcp a concensus.
In the preparation of the Annual Report the individ-
ual members have written the specific sections for which
they have been responsib e. Our report identifies these
sections and the author, although each section does, in
fact, represent the opinion of the ranel as a whole.
In the past we have had the subject of avionics.
During 1980 this has been encompassed in the hardware and
software sections.	 During this year, experience with the
"black boxes" has matured and did not seem to warrant a
separate treatment. The matter of interest from an avi-
onics point of view is the software and treatment of
changes. There are changes occurring but they are under
the control of the Configuration Board and - are being
handled properly.
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1. SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS
E
i
The PaneL has spent the major portion of its time
and,effort in 1980 on safe readiness of the Shuttle for
its first flight, STS-1, now scheduled for the spring of
1981. The year has been one of'intensive test, review,
and simulation. This activity has uncovered some new
areas of concern and narrowed others, but it is safe to
say that the Shuttle has passed the knee of the maturity
curve.
The Shuttle's first flight wil y provide a variety
of data that should substantiaLLy reduce many of the un-
certainties and wide variations in predictions now con-
fronting the designers. However, work is still. underway
and any ,prediction of readiness must be contingent on
this planned work being successfully accomplished. There
is, in our opinion, one particularly important item and
that is the sruccessfuL completion of the flight readiness
firing. We also have our constant caveat that time rust
be aLLowed for the astronauts to adequately train for
and absorb any late changes.
The Panel is optimistic that these reservations wiLL
not turn out to be constraints or unduly-delay the present
flight schedule.
The readiness of the Shuttle for the balance of the
flights in the initial series is strictly a function of
the lessons learned as the series progresses. Each of
these flights expands the flight envetope and chaLLenges
the system more than the previous flight in determining
the c-apabiLiti s and Limitations of the system.	 For
instance, the center of gravity for the first flight is
very narrowly Limited and can only be expanded into a
more useful range by experimenting with variations in the
initial flight series. 	 This progressive series requires
that the reduction and analysis of data be accomplished
between (Lights so that lessons learned can be applied.
In addition to data analysis, extensive ins p ections must
be accomplished after each of the early fLights. This
careful program wiLL outline the Limit,ati,ons, if any,
of the Shuttle as a transport system and point out the
areas of improvement necessary in the final operational
vehicle to provide the mission capability and turnaround
time necessary.
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For some years we have been disturbed by the impact
of funding economies on the NASA approach to STS-1 issues.
While this is not directly related to safety, it may create
an environment in which the best solutions to problems are
not always pursued and may result in the acceptance of
more risk than necessary. As a project such as the Shuttle
is inevitably ahead of the state of the art, it is impossible
to know if, in fact, a minimum risk program has been achieved,
hence, it is equally impractical to quantify the Panel's
present assessment. We do, however, unanimously feel that
such assessments be as definitive as it is feasible to make
them. Accordingly, the Panel has these recommendations:
(1) Pioneering programs such as the Shuttle must be
conservativeLY defined and adequately funded at the start
and throughout Life in order to insure a timely and satis-
factory conclusion with a minimum of risk and maximum cost
effectiveness,
(2) Sufficient time must be scheduled between flights
of the initial test'series to analyze data and implement
the changes indicated to upgrade the safety for each subse-
quent critical test.
(3) Insure that the eventual operationa! organization
is involved in the definition of any "product improvement"
program for the operational Shuttle.
(4) Define early and implement those long term develop-
ments necessary for the operational Shuttle; for instance,
uprated engines for more demanding missions.
(5) Develop and implement a more effective method
of assuring quality control, particularly with respect to
routine as well as new and unusai materials.
1980 has been a year of intensive activity on the part
of the program and scrutiny and review by outside groups.
During this process, many questions have surfaced and been
explained or acted upon. The engine has matured and we now
know how to effectively attach tiles. ConsequentLy,'the
rate of changes has subsided ,somewhat. The Panel is com-
fortable with what it seer for STS-1 and is happy that its
recommendations this year are generat, not technically
specific.
r
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2. NASA REVIEW SYSTEM!
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panet was established
by Congress in the aftermath of the Apollo 204 tragedy to
provide NASA and Congress with an independent assessment
of the acceptability of risk associated with NASA's space
and aeronautics programs, particularly those involving
manned flight. As this and prior annuat reports indicate,
the Panel takes its responsibilities seriously. We be-
lieve that NASA responds in a similar way to the Panel's
findings and recommendations. We would not hesitate to
declare that a program involved an unacceptable degree of
risk i# that was ouf, cn iJective judgment.
Nonetheless, even the most diligent panel of outside
experts cannot substitute for a conscientious, rigorous,
and weal-designed system of review maintained by NASA it-
self.,	 In the case of the Space Shuttle, as in all aero-
space endeavors, risks ultimately wilt be judged on the
basis of criteria established, interpreted, and enforced
by the program itself, culminating in the final readiness
reviews conducted by NASA's top management. Panel members
will also participate in these final reviews.
On the basis of frequent meetings throughout the
Shuttle's development, touching aLt°major areas, the PaneL
be_Lieves_thaat the first manned orbital flight will occur
only when NASA's top management is convinced that the
level of risk is acceptable. The review system has been
designed to permit NASA management access to a breadth of
informed opinion on the status of all major systems. There
is every reason to believe that serious reservations held
by any management level would be brought to top management's
attention and carefuLty evaluated.''' It is noteworthy that
1m`^key areas of Shuttle devetopment, such as the main engine
arld thermal protection system, more rigorous performance
criteria have been substituted for the initial standards in
response to development problems. This has been done even
though these new criteria were tikeLy to resuLt in further
program delays. Of course, this is no guarantee against
a catastrophic faiLure but it reveals an attitude of mind
and commitment to safety that should be welcorted--as-weLL
as expected--by Congress and the public.
In making this judgment as to the adequacy of NASA's
review procedures, the Panel feels compel ed to offer a
further observation on the funding and management philosophy
that has characterized the ShUttte program since its incep -
tion and that makes it considerably more difficult to
maintain this "safety-fi rst "" commitment.	 From the moment
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of its inception, the Space Shuttle program has been
seriously underfunded and its "success-oriented" or
"success-dependent" schedule, a direct outgrowth of this
underfunding, has been consistently too optimistic. The
technological difficulty of designing and building a
reusable space vehicLe, while appreciated fully by
Shuttle managers and en g ineers, has never been fully
comprehended by either Congress or the public. The
initial claim that the; Shuttle would be constructed
with "off-the-shelf" technology was both uninformed and
regrettable.
Two areas of Shuttle development--the main engine
and the thermal protection system--have generaLLy vied
with each other for the dubious distinction of being
the "long pole in the tenx." It is striking, however,
that the PaneL in its continuing reviews has encountered
few development areas thwi have-,been ab a to adhere to
anything like the initial budget or schedule.
	 In reality,
the Shuttle program is a tent filled with Long poles,
l
	
	
including such critical areas as software development
and testing, crew trainin g , flight controls, launch pro-
ce sinq, structural ` adequacy, as well as the main engine
and thermal protection system.
This fact suggests to the Panel that initial".funding
and schedule commitments were seriously in, error.
	
It is
difficult to ascertain ultimate responsibility or motivation
for this situation.
	
Some critics will point to the Office
of Management and Budget and the White House in tine Nixon,
Ford, and Carter Administrations as major contributors
by keeping an unrealistic, indeed arbitrary, Lid on
.:Shuttle development funding. Others will point to NASA
management for acquiescing too readily to these unrealistic
limitations.	 Stilt others wiL°L say that Congress shout
have been more alert to the funding and schedule problems,
even though Congress has consistently voted whatever funds
the respective Administrations have requested. 	 It .;is
undoubtedly true that NASA management and Shuttle contractors
could have done a-better Sob of using the resources that
were avaiLaole.	 It is to the credit of NASA's current
team,up to and including the Administrator, that they have
E	 insisted, against constant and recurring criticism, that
the Shuttle systems be fixed and past omissions be corrected
whatever the budget or schedule impact - aLL in the in-
terest of a reasonable STS-1 risk. In the end, it is less,
F
	
	 important to affix ultimate "b Lame" for the present situa-
tion than it is to recognize and act on the lessens of this
 unhappy experience. What are these lessons?
y
4
9
i
>°F,p a y
QF
First, unrealistic budgets and schedules ptar;t an
extraordinary and potentially dangerous burden on program
managers to cut corners in a way that could jeopardize
safety. As one veteran of the space business observed to
the Panel: "The system encourages managers to be unreal-
istic." It speaks well of the Shuttle program management
that they have not allowed this to impact safety.
Second, the United States cannot expect to sstain
a bargain basement space program. Either a climate of
opinion exists among the Executive, Congress, atv'd the
public that recognizes the significant costs and benefits
of space , R&D or it doesn't. if it doesn't, the Shuttle
experience suggests the wisdom of not trying to compensate
for this lack of support by designing a program where
everything is supposed to work the first time it is tried.
To say it clearly: don't begin major aerospace programs
unless the nation's elected leadership is ready to provide
a realistic base of support. Moreover, although it is
impossible to prove, the Panel has the strong suspicion
that a more realistic budget for the Space Shuttle earlier
in theprogram would have saved -money in th,e'Long run,
as well as produced an Orbiter that mw would be well
al.ong in its flight test program.
These observations call for what may be an impossible
degree of budgetary "realism" in a period of inflation
and fiscal restraint.	 (Nonetheless, since a continuation
of the "success dependent" funding philosophy entails the
potential of erodin g , over time, the basic commitment to
safe ,yI.y that must characterize the U.S. space program, the
Panet believes it is timely and appropriate to express
these views.
5
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3. HARDWARE SYSTEMS
Basic Structure
Under "Structural Adequacy" the unique environmental
requirements that affect the strength and deformation of
the Orbiter structure will be covered. From a functional
standpoint, the structure is straightforward and corresponds
to good standard practice. Tests have confirmed its ade-
quacy if the thermal protection system fulfills its design
goal to keep structural temperatures and gradients within
design limits.
It should be noted that attachment of high temperature
nonmetal-tic elements of the structure (leading edges) to
the aluminum is a unique and complex problem. Tests have
been accomplished, and will continue, to assure the adequacy
of these mechanical attachments. Such attachments as well
as moving surface seals, and hin g e brackets have all been
tested within the capabilities of ground test facilities.
Based on such tests and through analyses, it is be ieved
that the environment of the planned STS
-1 flight can be
fully sustained by these orbital vehicle elements.
The unique vibration environment for hold down and
Launch is severe and preliminary firing of the main engines
must b y
 followed by minute inspection where feasible not
only of the thermal protection system components but also
the flight control system, particularly the surfaces and
their attachments, seals, hinges, and actuators.
moors and Closures
There are seve;-al unique and c-riticai door operations
that must be successful if the Shuttle is to complete its
mission. The first is the closure over the large cryo±r
genic connections (liquid ox yg en and liquid hydrogen
Lines) between the external tank and the Orbiter. This
door syst'm is uni que in that it must be full open and
flat on the bottom surface of the Orbiter and must be
Locked in this position to survive the severe launch en-
vironment. Once separation of the external tank takes
place, the compartment and the line terminations must be
rotated 180 0
 to fit flush with the belly of the Orbiter
with their complement of thermal protection tiles in
position to protect the closed door surface during reentry.
The,;Losing and locking of this door in the high heat portion
of the belly is essential for safe reentry. Indications
of closure of this door pair do not follow modern transport
aircraft practice for reliability of indication, but the
door actuation and locking system appear adequate and a
multiplicity of ground testsaffirm this adequacy. There
,.	 ^`	 6
is Little that the astronauts can do, except "recycle,l'
if the door lock indications show an "unlock" situatio ►►
thus the reliability of indication magi be the Least critical
element of the system.
The uniqueness of the payload bay doors is their large
size (2 doors, each approximatety 60' x 10 1 ), which,
coupled with their cooling panels and thw thermal environ-
ment Extremes (including orbital soak), impose stringent
demands on the Locking and hinge systems to achieve positive
closure for reentry. The door system incorporates seals
and sliding connections between door eLements so that,
once Locked the door structure contributes to the "stiffness"
of the body structure in bending and torsion. Since this
contribution may be inconsistent due to Lock rigging and
seal wear, it has been ascertained that Shuttle control
margins are adequate even when the "stiffness" contributed
by the doors was assumed to he nonexistent. In spite Of
this margin, it is essential that these doors be Locked
during reentry. The "Locked" indication system has elements
of hazard but the system can largely be visuaLLy inspected
from the aft crew station through a window in the forward
wall of the payload bays This "confirmation" must be
included in the c^•i,a procedures and training for STS-1
until a more direct system of "doors-locked" is incorpor-
ated in the Orbiter.
Power Systems
The three eLectricaL power systems and the three
cryogenic powered fueL cells are based on past experience
in the ApoLLo and Skylab programs and careful analysis
of potentiaL faiLures and emergencies. The planned
down-moding of the system appears rational and should
cover a reasonable series of failure conjectures.
A similar 'a- source approach was ta,2n in the case
of th_2 hydraulic power needed for Orbiti'l flight controls,
main engine vectoring, landing gear extension, brakes, etc.
Three auxiliary power units are instaLled in the compart-
ment aft of the payload bay. Test experience with these
units has been inconsistent. The Panel has repeatedly
reviewed pro g ress and investigated Orbiter control on
the assumption that one or two of these units fail during
a mission. Control appears to be adequate with one failure
and possible (with nearly 'perfect initial entry conditions)
with 2 units out. This appears to be a reasonable basis
for STS-1 flight.
A similar, but two auxiliary power unit hydraulic
system is instaLLed in each of the two solid boosters.
This system has a very short mission time in which it
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amust operate which can justify the assumption that dual
redur;dant ri"ther than tripLe redundant assurance is
adequate. An additionaL hazard that can be rectified
in Later flights is the fault of the installation where
one unit is in the plane of the turbine wheeL of the
other the ► eby possibly expos!Ing both units to a faiLure
in one. This is a sufficientLy remote hazard that it
can be accepted for early tetit flights but changes should
be made in subsequent operational solid rocket boosters.
Separation Systems
Ground testing has confirmed the repeatability of
the major separation eLements (between Orbiter, external
tank and so Lid rocket boosters) as well as the Lack of
hazard to the thermaL protection systems from any debris.
One conjectured hazard during the launch that has not
been shown to be inconsequentiaL by ground testing has
been the possibility of ice formation on the Orbiter-
ex-ternal tank attachment members of the separation system.
This ice, if shed during ascent, could damage the thermal
protection surfaces. To eliminate this possibility for
STS-1 special precautions are being taken at the launch
pad to prevent ice formation which resuLts from fueling
with cryogenic Liquids.	 Flight and launch experience
will confirm the prevalence of this hazard and may suggest
simple ways to avoid it,in the future.
Exhaust gas from the booster separation motors on
the solid rocket boosters impacting the Orbiter surface
is a cause of some concern but the exposure time and
impact energy do not appear sufficient to create an STS-1
hazard. Inspection of the thermal prote ,rtion the after
the STS-1 mission may indicate that this effect is present
but the Panel believes that this concern is unnecessarily
conservative.
Flight Control S s m
Rudder Dive Brake System
Of all the mechanicaL systems on the Orbiter required
for reentry and landing the Panel believes that the
rudder-dive-brake actuation system presents the maximum
potential for failure. The "series" nature of the system,
its differential gear sets, the singular surface from root
to tip aLL add up to a list of individually criti-cal ele-
ments. The faiture of an y one of these could,invalidate
the triply redundant hydrauLic motor system provided for
actuation. Inspection, ground testing, and incorporation
of fixes (some of which are in the software) provide
8'
sufficient confidence to accept this system for STS-1. Hov°
ever, the Panel believes that there sre obvious changes
'in system concept that should be incorporated before the
Orbiter is qualified for routine operation.
Elevon and Body Flap Controls
As a result of a major design review several years ago,
the Orbiter design team responded to elevon and body flap
control system concerns by reducing the single points of
failure that could invalidate the triple redundancy con-
cept of the hydraulic power system. TFvis improvement,
coupled with the meticulous simulation and inspection of
the present systems reduces tfie risk during the first test
flights to an acceptable level.
Both elevons and body flap use sets of single actuators
into which all three hydraulic systems are fed. Thus these
individwal actuators become single point failure hazards.
Such a failure would appear to be remote and a change in
this concept is not suggested for the flight test program.
Thrust Vector Controls on Main Engines and
Solid Rocket Boosters
As noted previously, the solid rocket thrust vector
controls are of a dual redundant type with two power units
in each booster supplying the hydraulic power to actuator
pistons. The Space Shuttle main engine gimbal controls
are similar in that they have a dual redundant power
source each from a different combination of the three
power units in the Orbiter. This seeming inconsistency
in concept where there are three auxiliary power sources
but only two are used per engine can be, at least par-
tially, justified by the fact that there is a hydraulic
power lockup mode that maintains a fixed thrust direction
in the event of two auxiliary power unit failures thereby
Leaving the other two engine thrust vector controls to
help maintain Orbiter flight direction.
Both vector control systems use single p istons so
that Failures at the piston actuator system will invali-
date the function. A completely independent thrust vector
control for each power system'should,.be studied as part of
any major improvement program.
A vector controt of substantially smaller capacity is
used to gimbal the two orbital,idaneuvering system
engine nozzles used for orbit injection and transfer.
These also utilize a dual redundant power sow_rt* from
electric Motors, each inde(;endent of the other driving a
screw jack to _move the engine nozzle.
9
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Orbiter Rott and Yaw 'Thrusters
For orbit attitude control and initial reentry attitude
control, a number fixed small thrusters forming the reaction
control system are used without vector control. It was
suggested that these thrusters, when used in the reentry
flight phase at low dynamic pressure but high Mach number
may have an important impact on the norms{ aerodynamics of
the vehicle that could reduce the effectiveness or increase
control demands on the aerodynamic controls. This, though
difficult, has now been carefully evatuated in wind tunnels
and has been determined to be inconsequential to :control
of the reentry.
Landing Gear
During evaluation of the Landing gear system prior to
the extensive approach and landing tests, it was determined
that the margin of safety in the wheels, bearings, axles,
and tires were marginal for th6'expected Orbiter touch-
down weight. In response the program has procured new
wheels, axles, bearings, and tires complying with the in-
creased strength requirements,, This does not remove one
potential hazard noted in the previous revipti, Having
only two wheels per side exposes the system to a probable
dual tire failure on one side due to the overload imposed
on the remaining wheel of the pair if the other one fails.
Strengthenin g the wheels and tires makes a "first" faiLure
more remote but it may be judicious for the NASA design
team to carefully evaluate a gear system with 3 or 4 tires
per side.
The extension system of the main and nose gear is a
"dual" system with either hydraulic pressure from one
auxiliary power unit or a pyrotechnic pressure used to un-
lock the gear after which the door opens and the gear deploys.
Its simplicity is to be commended. It has been exercised
during the Approach and Landing Tests on Orbiter 101 and
would appear to be entirely adequate for STS-1 and subsequent
test flights. All three gear units will extend without
power due to gravity and drag, but the time to extend'is
critical for landing and this final backup s y stem may be too
slow.
Environmental Conti
Evaluating the life support system for safety is
complicated by the common functions of the environmental
contrals to provide oxygen and hydrogen to fuel ceLLs,
purge of various functional compartments and the common
ORIGINAL PAGE 0
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cooling requirements of avionics systems, cabin atmo -
sphere and fuel c.#--Lt systems. The interdependTi-tce of
these systems Oefies analysis of any one system in terms
of dual or triple redundancy of the elements. Neverthe-
Less, the many possibilities for down-moding and reducing
demands on the system indicate that it is adequate for
the test fLight program. It is suggested that a more
thorough faiLure anaLysis of this system wiLL yield
suggest-ions for a more reLiabLe system.
4. STRUCTURAL ADEQUACY OF
THE ORBITER
The Orbiter loads have gone through several revisions,
with the Latest being the internaL member Loads defined by
the Automatic Systems for Kinematic Analysis, ,5.4 Loads.
The mechanical portion of these loads seems to be in good
shape. However, questions as to the thermal aspects of the
Loading conditions still exist. Based on these 5.4 roads,
the structural integrity of the Orbiter for the first
manned orbital M ght;? STS-1, except as noted below, is not
in question so Long as:,the thermal protection system tiles
remain intact through at Least the high heating phase of
reentry. This is, of course, particularly the case for
aLL black tiles which are subjected to the highest heat loads
and temperatures.
A good number of tests have been conducted on Orbiter
primary structure components.' The second flight vehicle,
099, used as a structural test vehicle, was tested to
approximately 100% to 120% of 5.4=`design Limit mechanical
Loads and those minor deficiencies which showed up have
been corrected. These deficiencies included fittings,
brackets, gussets and the Like which were beefed-up or
added as required. Other than for the forward fuselage,
no thermal toads -' were included in these tests; additional
test specimens, consisting of major parts, of the overaLL
Orbiter structure, will be tested to uLtimate loads
(mechanicaL plus equivalent thermal loads produced me-,
chanicaLLy where practical). Some of these tests have
been completed and a'LL are expected to be finished by the
fall of 1981.
The effects of structuraL,flexibiLity have been
taken into account in the aerodynamic stability and con-
trot coefficients used to predict the flight character-
r	 istics of the Orbiter during reentry flight.
Wind tunnel tests and analysis indicate the Shuttle
is flutter-free up to a dynamic pressure (q) of approxi-
mateLy 1200 psf. The maximum q of any mission is 819 psf.
The STS-1 mission will have a worst case q	 = 670 psf.
We believe that the Shuttle is in good shape x withrespect
to aerodynamic fLutter.
The Orbiter 102 Ground Vibration Survey indicated
some dynamic coupling between the longitudinaL control
system and a natural vibration mode of the Orbiter. Further 	 a``
readiness review.	
fight	 y"
p	
work is being done to resalve this issue before fl 	 L
f	
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A math model of the completely mated launch vehicle
is used to analytically predict Pogo stability and the
structuraLresponse to oscillations in solid rocket and
main engine thrusts. This math model was also used to
predict the responses to oscillating forces used in the
Mated Vehicle Ground Vibration Tests. Correlation be-
tween these 'test results and'- 'ialytical predictions were
not complete. Further work is being done to improve
correlation, and the flight readiness firing will provide
additional test verificaticn.
Based on 5.4 Loads, the S'hermal protection system
appears to be the weak link in the structural integrity
of the Orbiter. With the main effort to insure satis-
factory performance of the thermal protection system
focused on STS-1 capability, the many test and analysis
efforts to minimize concerns are progressing we 1. Extreme
care in installation, vigorous testingboth off-line
and on the Orbiter itself, and careful management review
support these efforts. The Orbiter/externaL tank inter-
face, for example, has been reconfigured using reinforced
carbon-carbon material to eLiminate the failure; addi-
tional attachment area is provided by cementing the tiles
to the "filler-bars.` A pyroshock test in the Orbiter/
external tank interface area has been successfully con-
ducted to prove out the new and stronger modification.
An item of concern is that some quaaification testing of
the the system is date, and "life-testing" will not be
compaeted before STS-1. We also suggest that further work
needs to be done to better understand the dynamic charac-
teristi-cs of the Strain Isolation Pad.
Shuttle First Flight (STS-1)
With the first flight scheduLed in March 1981, there
remain several areas which are of concern:
o The first concern is that the thermal loading
of the Orbiter wings for the STS-1 mission
has been defined as Mission 3 which is the
most benign of all the design load cases with
respect to thermal stresses. The Mission 3
thermal assumptions are not representative
of any reaL mission. Since thermal gradients,
in addition to material temperatures, are of
great concern, the Orbiter is sensitive to
mission profiles. The actual STS-1 gradients
appear to be Larger than those of K5ission 3,
which was used for wing assessment. This pro-
blem might be aLLeviated by pre-conditioning
the Orbiter, prior to deorbit and entry, to
13
control the initial temperatures and minimize
the resulting gradients. However, these
resulting gradients could still be m:jre severe
than those of Mission 3. Recommended action
regarding this concern is addressed later in
this section of the report.
o A second concern is that the "real" surface
roughne<s of the Orbiter lower surface (due
to tile-to-tile mismatch) can certainly cause
increased heating. This, in conjunction with
the not fully definable temperatures of the
STS-1 mission, may result in overall negative
safety margins and possible mid-fuselage lower
cover buckling. Analysis of these potential
problems is now in process and will be com-
pleted priorto STS-1 flight readiness review.
A great deal of effort to minimize the step
and gap variations has been made, including
the use of tile-to-tile gap filters and again
very careful installations.
o A third concern is that the "Abort-Once-Around"
y be more critical in terms ofcondition ma
thermal loading than the two day STS-1 mission.
Although this is an emergency condition, it
could happen on STS-1. Analyses are in pro-
cess taking into accouW,, both landing and
maneuver load factors as they affect overall
design margins. The results of these analyses
should be reviewed in time to determine their
impact on the STS-1 mission.
Based on concerns one and three, the Panel feels that
positive plans of action should be implemented as soon as
practical to update the thermal structural analysis and
resolve the concerns noted above prior to the STS-1 readiness
review.
Operational Capability
The effects of differential temperatures (gradients)
on the structural integrity of the Shuttle Orbiter will
probably require another cycle of analysis after in-flight
real-time data becomes available from STS-1. This data
will be used to correct_ and improve the math models
currently in use and allow for expansion of the fligt;:L
envelope for the subsequent missions.
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The primary structure of the Orbiter is Largely
aluminum sheet, and stringer construction. The compres-
sion strength of this structure is frequently determined
by buckling or locaL crippling at stress levels consider-
abLy Lower than the compression allowable of the materiaL.
Differential temperatures can induce seLf-balancing ten-
sion and compression Loads within the structure. The
most ,worrisome of these loads are the compression loads
in the sheet and stringer external skins that support
the thermal protection system tiles.
	 (Tile structural
integrity can be jeopardized by excessive deflections
of the supporting panels.) These differentiaL temperatures
within the "structure are the accumulative result of the
heat inputs and outputs that the Orbiter experiences
throughout a given mission. Aerodynamic heating rates vary
with surface roughness and resultant degree of flow tur-
buLence. Radiation heating in space varies with orienta-
tion with respect to the sun. AnaLyticaL procedures
are complex and require considerable computer time. How-
ever, this PaneL believes that, before the Orbiter can
be committed to routine operation, another round of
thermal/structural analysis is desirable to more accu-
rateLy characterize aero thermodynamic effects and ^;hotrld
be done before the present design team is reassigned
The new round of analysis should have an updated data
base of heating rates and t-hermaL performance plus updated
three-dimensional heat transfer models. The analysis
should be done by a closely knit team of structural
analysts and heat transfer analysts, the structural analysts
providing insight into critical structuraL Loadings in
the search for Limiting mission scenarios. The Panel feels
this additional thermal/structural analysis would allow
operatianaL planners to better and more safely utilize
the fuLL capability of the Orbiter in future missions, and
to promote advanced/better thermal protection systems.
j	 .IrRIGITA
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5. OROPULSION SYSTEMS
The development of each of the several elements that
comprise the Shuttle propulsion systems has made excellent
progress during the past year. Albeit some testing remains
to be accomplished,, prospects for completion of alt testing
required for certification for STS-1 by January 1981 are
judged to be quite g6od.
External Tank
Qualification testing is essentially complete. Final
tank flow system functional qualification requires satis-
factory completion of the remaining test runs of the Main
Propulsion Test program. Most of the aerodynamic fairings
for protuberances, etc., have been verified. Difficulty
with the adhesion of the wedge fairings for the instrument
islands has led to their deletion for STS-1. There is the
usual paperwork includin g deviations/waivers to clean up
but there are no outstanding problems at present.
Solid Rocket Booster
All qualification firings have been completed satisfac-
torily. Only a few component or subassembly tests remain
to be accomplished. The motors for STS-1 have been stacked
and support the total Shuttle vehicle. A special inspec-
tion of the p r.o,pe `llant grain for cracks was conducted with
satisfactory results. The auxiliary power unit fuel control
valve problem associated with leakage of hydrazine fuel onto
the valve's electricatwiring has been diagnosed and proper
steps are being taken to resolove this for STS-1. Further
changes will be made for future rocket use.
Orbital Maneuvering System
The Orbital Maneuvering System pod assembly suffered
structural failures during the acoustic excitation tests of
the pod at 172 db. Several tank supports and other brackets
failed. Corrective redesigns. were implemented and have been
tested for six mission cycles at the qualification levels.
The results were satisfactory. Some subassembly tests remain
"	 to be completed for certification.. These tests -should be
completed by the end of 1980. Provisions have been made to
minimize the problem associated with moisture absorption by
the composite graphite/epoxy pod structure by enclosing the
system in a cocoon (supported by the Rotating Service Struc-
ture) purged withdry nitrogen at all times except during
Launch day operation. Tanks with strengthened propelpanti
screens are installed for flight.
x
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ALL other qualification tests for STS-1 have been
satisfactorily completed and the Orbital Maneuvering System
is essentially ready.
Reaction Control System
	 '
This hardware is also in good shape for STS-1. The
problems reported in Last year's report have been resolved
by a combination of hardware and software modifications.
All of the changes have been verified by test.
There remains one concern about a possible passage
of a bubble of pressurant'gas through the propmLLant tank
screens under extreme flight conditions. A combination
of anaLys;s and test program is in process to resolve this
issue. The present assessment is that for normal flight
conditions the tanks are quite adequate but that for the
extreme case of a return to launch site abort there may
be no margin. This work shouLd be completed by the end of
January',1981.
Space ShuttLe Main Engine
The main engine has made major strides towards certif-
ication for STS
-1. The fourth cycle of certification (at
102 percent thrust) is complete. A few remaining component
d_evel.opment verification specification tasks (tests) wiLL
be completed in January 1981. The engine has shown increas-
ing maturity during aLL test operations. The engine has
been run at 109 percent (full power) for sufficient time to
provide confidence that a margin exists and that in an
emergency situation the engine could be called on to perform
at that thrust level.
The two more' -'significant operi problems, viz:	 the fuel
preburner wall burn-through of midyear and the potential
overspeed of the high pressure oxygen turbopump during shut-
down in flight are fast approaching solution. The preburner
liner has been redesigned and tested. A molybdenum insert
for further protection has been devised and is in the latter
part of its tests. The turbopump overspeed problem solution
adopted is to close the prevalves early in the shutdown
sequence and to pressurize the oxygen feed Lines through
the Pogo accumuLator during shutdown. Testing completed to
date has given encouraging results.
Most of the other problems are those affecting multiple
reuse of the engines. Those include such items as spalling
of the turbopump bearings, turbine blade cracks, etc. For
STS-1 the inspection program keeps these under controL,. The
engine program continues to feel the effects of hardware
shortages in testing which does not affect STS-1.
17
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Testing of the futt power configuration has begun,
and with the Pretiminary Ftight Certification Tests for
$TS-1 compteted, this is the focus of upcoming main engine
`lst activ ity.
ALL totd, the engine is in good shape for STS-1 and
should be able to support the first flight.
It must be noted that in alt the preceding, emphasis
has been placed on propulsion systems readiness for
STS-1. For subsequent flights additional and more stringent
certification requirements must be met and much added testing
wilt be'^ requi red.
6. THERMAL PROTECTION SYSTEM
During the past year, the Orbiter thermal protection
system has had a very rigorous scrutiny and basic problems
have been uncovered and, the Panel believes, resolved.
The definition of what the loads on individual tiles
were had not been achieved until midyear. This includes
both nature and magnitude. Lmproved and agreed upon
analyses were finally achieved so "engineering' s
 could oe
released. A major problem has been the structural integrity,
of the brittle the at the tile-SIP bond line. Earlier
attempts at resolving this by a thin plastic or metal
laminate were steps in the right direction, but not a solu-
tion. The problem has now been solved by densifying the
bottom layer of the individual tide itself by inpregnating
that interface layer with b suspension of fine silica
particles. Consequently, if there are the failures in
tension they are breaks in the body of the tile, rather
than a parting at the bond line at relatively unpredictable
Loads.
This definition of loads and the fundamental improve-
ment in the the structure has been coupled with a much
improved applicationand testing procedure. The appli-
cation is a monumenta-1 task, involvin g many steps that are
Labor intensive and must be ofan uniforrmally high quality.
To achieve this, n*w test equipment, procedures, and
traininghad to be developed, and consistently and completely
applied. In addition, very detailed records were compiled
so that the history and state of each step in the process
could be determined. There are some unfinishe y7 combined
Loads tests that must be satisfactorily concluded to verify,,
the load analyses. These tests are in a tight schedule
situation. Upon this satisfactory conclusion and after our
examination of the pains'tak,ing process, the Panel concludes
that the thermal protection system will be satisfactory for
the Orbiter's first f ight,but cautions that time must bevy
made avalLabte to properly finish the application.
Before one can predict the future 6f the therma pro-
tection system, the Panel feels that the.-.experience of the
first flight is necessary, for four re-sonss
(1) The amount of the damage due to the flight and,
in fact, due to handling after the flight, must.
be
 ascertained.
(2) The gap filler:, seem satisfactory from a thermal
point of view but without some experience their
Life, is unpredictable.:t!
(3) The strain isolation pad on which \he the is
mounted is not well characterized, for the reason
that the demands on it prohjjl it the use of many
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3of the more prosaic structural materials. The
net result is that one cannot be sure of its
characteristics for reuse until additional tests
are made after the first flight. This comment
applies only to those portions of the instaltation
that are exposed to high thermst and structurat
loads'and, as such, will most tikety affect turn-
around time. The present effort to find a better
strain isolation pad should be continued and, as
noted, should be aided by data from the first
flight.
(4) The need to have worthwhile nondestructive evatu-
ation tests of the tiles before and after each
mission to assure system integrity.
An additf'jhal area of reuse concern is the need for
waterproof tiles and capability to do the proper water-
proofing upon landing after the STS-1 mission and prior to
Orbiter terry back to KSC. This is kinder review and a
waterproofing test program has been started.
The Panel feels that work shou d continue to took for
alternate thermal protecti on systems, with an emphasis
upon a less fragile, more easily maintained system for
repeated reuse'^e.g., increased Cite-coating thickness or
use of a cont,,^ nuous strain isotation pad instead of "tile
f ootprint + Miler bars." However, we do feet that the
present system does not pose an undue risk for the Shuttle'sfirst flight.
7. PYROTECHNIC SYSTEMS
-,. a .-
	.
The Shuttle requires the use of a large number of
pyrotechnic devices for a variety of functions, mainly
separation and actuation. It also carries a range safety/
destruct package and, of cours", the solid rocket booster
motors are pyrotechnically-initiated. The ejection seats
are also pyro-actuated, as is the initial power assist to
the gravity-drop landing gear. The nature of the Orbiter
and the Shuttle's stacked configuration is such that these
pyrotechnic devices must be i.nstaLLed at different times
and all of ttiem must be in place during the checkout phase
in the vehicle assembly building and at the launch pad.
During that time they are without the benefit of mechanicaL
safe and arm devices, but are electrically disconnected
(except the Orbiter fire suppression system).
The Panel, has been concerned as to whether or not the
differences between NASA's application of pyrotechnics and
the traditional ordnance technology maintains the same
degree of safety traditionally obtained.
Our investigation started with the NASA standard
initiator and its quality control. Ve found a knowledgeable,
competent group of people with an excellent test and record-
keeping program that, in our opinion, establishes the
quality of the initiator.	 It should be pointed out that
NASA's use of initiators in space represents a small number
of units as compared to many ordnance programs and, hence,
greater average control is possible in a practical sense.
We have looked at the methods of safing--principally
disconnect--and the testing routines to establish the presence
or absence of a bridgewire on the circuit. The complexity
and makeup of the complete Shuttte to a certain extent
dictatr,s the procedures. The procedures, both to safe and
to assure that a live initiator is on a circuit when it is
needed, impress us as bein g excellent. The risk of a mal-
function, either advertent or inadvertent is acceptable.
The Panel, has also reviewed the Range Safety/Destruct
;-	 Systems and Procedures. We find the system in good shape
and the cooperation between NASA and the Eastern Test Range
personneL excellent, with a good training and operating
program in place. The precautions to prevent inadvertent
ignition of the system are satisfactory.
A decision was made to equip the early two-man crew
Shuttle missions with ejection seats in case of certain
emergencies; for instance, the necessity to use the range
safety destruct system. A military seat that had high
21
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altitude use was chosen ^*nd adapted to the ShuttLe. This
seat, horizontal at launch, is of very limited use early
in the launch sequence and, of course, has an upper aLti-
tude Limit of perhaps 120,000 feet. AdditionatLy, it
might conceivably be of use in reenttry, under some condi-
tions. Under some deptoynents, there are high tateraL
acceterations when the chute opens that may be eased by
battasting to change the center of gravit y . If such minor
changes improve the performance--fine--but the Panet would
caution against major changes that might invalidate the
seat's successful history, with insufficient time before
#Light to requalify the unit.
The initiators for the solid boosters employ a safe
and arm device that is conventional in philosophy, and
the Panet believes that this critical unit is safe when
it should be. The solid rocket motors themselves are a
massive pyrotechnic and should an inadvertent ignition
of the motor, or one of its segments, occur from any cause
a catastrophe would result. The Panel has reviewed the
results of or, in-dopth study of this matter and concurred
in a course of action to resuLt in a satisfactory risk,
from a safety and a nationaL asset poi!rt of view. The
Panet has reported separateL!y to the Administrator on
this matter.
1
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a. SOFTWARE PROGRAMS
At least a year ago, trer p was a push to validate
the Arbiter software for an earlier scheduled STS-1
Launch date. This resulted in verification and change
control activities that benefited the flight software.
The shuttle schedule dela y has allowed time for the
absorption of those changes which have occurred. However,
there has been one major area of concern: Orbiter re-
entry flight stability and control margins requirements
might very well result in some software changes that
affect simulation and crew training activities. The
program is aware of the seriousness of this and the Panel
is confident that only mandatory changes will be m:4de.
The Panel harbors a nagging concern about the surprises
that can develop from software patches that have not been
thoroughly tested. Quite natural(y, mission simulations
and other test exercises uncover the need for improvements
which most easily and quickly are accomplished in computer
program changes. However, in a system so complex with
sophisticated interdependent components, conflict in the
computer logic can arise unless the software modifications
are ver y thorou g hly tested. There is potential here for
schedule impact.
The amount of software testing in the various facil-
ities, such as the Shuttle Avionics Integration Laboratory
and the other simulators, is impressive and the Panel is
confident that the flight software will adequately support
the Shuttle's first orbital mission.
Another aspect to be considered is the software in-
voLved in the Launch Processing System. This system,
which is new to NASA!s launch activities, is a computer -con
trolled, automatic implementation of the countdown proce-
dure, which is discussed separately. Development of the
software for this system has occurred late in the program
and is unique in that test r' -')ineers can write their own
segments of the Dotal package'. Over the last year, the
Panel has been concerned about the integration and verifi-
cation of these various segments and the possibility of
unwanted interaction of the various routines that could
affect the Launch adversely. The Shuttle program has been
running very extensive verification tests in the Shuttle
Avionics Integ^a^))tion Laboratory facility of the many
Launch processing and countdown routines. In otir opinion,
this testing should preclude any malfunctions. Additionally,
the KSC Test Director can override the system, at an y time
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and a hardwire emergency capability is provided. Pre-
venting the Launch Procesr,ing System from modifying
the flight software in the Orbiter under any conditions
must continue to be a part of the development work.
We would deem this system to be satisfactory and
it Will be ind i spensabt,e, in the future routine operation
of the Spaci* Transportation System.
u
9. FLIGHT CONTROLS
The Panel's concern over stability and control on
reentry is based on an appreciation of the extremely
difficult prob,,Aem facing the design engineer of the con-
trod system,The entry trajectory "window" is tightly
bounded by st `Nucturat and thermaL constraints. The ability
of the flight control LSystem to guide the Orbiter in that
trajectory is complicated by the varying degree of author-
it y of the control means. At low dynamic pressures, the
reaction control jets are necessary; as q increases it
is necessary, to use the lift vector to augment drag
calling for roll, and angle of attack increases causing
both the rudder to be blanked and vorticies shedding from
the nose, all of which add to the somewhat uncertain aero
effects. Accordingly yaw jets are used well into the
aerodynamic region, adding to the uncertainties of possible
vehicle interactions.
The derivation of the control equations that govern
the signals to the reaction jets and aero surface controls
involve several coordinate transformations, consideration
of inertia coupling, as well as aero cross coupling,
scheduling of the coefficients that vary with Mach No.
and dynamic pressure, as well as the gain and lead/
Lag terms necessary for stability. The design must provide
margins that accommodate the variations and uncertainties
in the aerodynamic coefficients, structural responses,
and control effectiveness.
Inherent in the design are the,:rrequencies of the
structural modes of vibration which have been obtained both
from an elaborate mathematical model of the vehicle as well
as from laboratory tests conducted on a carefully authenticated
quarter-scale model. Despite the care and attention of the
structural modeling; there exists, in some quarters, an
uneasiness concerning the predictability of vibration modes
of the actuaL vehicle. The latest dynamic stability testing
at KSC did not lay to rest the concerns of the skeptical.
Refinements of the modeling and improved analysis must con-
tinue so that no significant discrepancies remain.
Many of the control parameters and gains of the digital
flight control system are determined in flight by indirect
inference made from navigation ► information gleaned from
gyros, accelerometers and TACAN data. The more conventional
air data quantities are not readily available. Research on
a direct air data measuring-system is underway in NASA.
Although it will be unavailable on its current schedule for
the first flight, its development, if successful, should be
seriously considered for retrofitting at the earliest
nnccihla +inea_
The basic data base for the entry aerodynamics has
been the subject of the most extensive investigation possible.
Although most experts express confidence in this area,
new information on this subject continues to grow. It is
essential that when available, these new data should be
included wherever appropriate. There is no flight experience
at the high Mach numbers and high angles of attack to which
the ShuttLe will be subjected.
The above complexity raises the question of verification
of the control design. Short of actual flight, the only
method is that of high fidelity simulation.
90. FLIGHT INSTRUMENTATION
During the past year, the Panel has initiated some
studies into Shuttle instrumentation. This very complex
vehicle depends heavily on extensive use of transducers
and electronics for proper operations and also to collect
data that will confirm performance predictions for further
flight tests and expansion of flight envelope.
In the conduct of these learning encounter"s at
Johnson Space Center, Kennedy Space Center, and Dryden
Flight Research Center (including a complete mission
simulation), it appears that adequate information and re-
dundancy is provided by flight instrumentation. Consider-
ing the onboard Limits in ability to processinformation,
store and/or telemeter aero, temperature, and other air-
frame data, backup recordin g capability in the development
flight instrumentation might welt be increased. The Panel
beLieves,, however, this is an acceptable risk;, for the
first flight.
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11. CREW TRAINING
The delays in the flight schedule of the STS -1 have
provided additional time for crew training. Terminal
area energy management flights into Edwards, and into the
White Sands strip with the Shuttle Training Aircraft have
served to maintain proficiency. The Shuttle Training
Aircraft and other infLight simulators have been used to
verify and tune control system refinements, such as the
pilot induced oscillation suppression filter. Although
the simulators have been mainly engaged in flight control
design work; the astrunauts have participated and contri-
buted to that effort.
A number of simulators are being used to explore a
wide range of emergency and contingency procedures. In
particular, the technique of "down moding" as a crew
option appears to many to be critical for flight safety.
The crew is learning to f;ly the simulator in the down
moded configuration and to develop criteria for the cir-
cumstances which might dictate its use.	 For example, in
the event of a control problem such as Loss of reaction
control jets or unexpected variations in critical aero-
dynamic coefficients which might produce otherwise uncon-
troLl.able oscillations, the crew can select a manual
mode of flight with reduced control system gains.
Down moding or any such interference with the auto-
matic flight control system is regarded by the crew as
an emergen.'c y measure only. For the first fli g ht they
,0prefer only to initialize the automatic system and assume
:the role of display monitoring during the descent through
!the high Mach number regimes.
The simulator does exhibit some problems which might
hamper effective crew training especially in the manual
c	 modes. A 350 millisecond delay in the display appears to
k	 be more than just an annoyance and contributes also to
the difficulties of monitoring entry flight control perfor-
mance. This problem, which is related to an inherent
'deviation in the simulator fidelity has been called to
the attention of the program.
,, ELevon oscillations, which are manifested in the
simulator, may or may not be characteristic of actual
veh`iale behavior. Since it is always present, the cond-
tion might simply be symptomatic of a simulator hardware
problem. In the flight vehicle, the astronauts feel that
such oscillations would be intolerable.. Potential re
solutions are under consideration for application to the -
simulators as a first step.
The Panel, of course, has had limited observations
of the crew training simul,ators in operation. They are
receiving the most competent attention possible as con-
tingency planning causes an expansion of the procedures
necessary to cope with emergencies. The crew is experi-
enced as are also the instructors and the Panel feels
confident that crew training will be adequate for the
First Manned Orbital Flight.
(^►i f ^ Y!t' x^  Pit	 1.
G,
u
24
•	 r
12. GROUND SIMULATIONS
Recognizing the importance of simulation to the
design of the control equations and the verification
of the control system, the Panel recommended in 1979
that Johnson Space Center organize a technical management
group to coordinate the efforts of various organizations
that were engaged in simulations. The Entry Flight
Simulation Inte,.,gration Group was formed and has met
monthl y this past year. In addition to defining and
assigning tasks to the various talented groups available,
it has been ver y effective in "integrating" (cross
feedin g of information, and engendering appreciation of
problems) the separate technical disciplines; i.e.,
aerodynamics, controls, thermal, structures, and flight 	 ►
operations. The group's charter includes consideration
of control problems on ascent, return to launch site
and abort-to-orbit and abort-once-around. This work
supports STS-1 as well as future missions.
The concentrated work on analysis and simulation of
the problems of reentry, and the progress that is becoming
apparent, has done much to allay the Panel's concern
about the dangers incident to reentry. The control pro-
blems during ascent benefit from the availability of great
authority from the vectored thrust of the main engines
and the orbital maneuvering system.
Ground simulation is a powerful and necessary tool
in the design and first time use of the control system;
but, not sufficient to fully prove the accuracy and com-
prehensiveness of the design for operational use. That
will come only through the gathering and use of data from
later>orbital missions.	 Its other important function is
in tr-aining of the crews.
9
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13. FLIGHT RULES
The current published Flight Rules (preliminary.,
Revision C, June 20, 1980, and Revision C, August 27,
1980) have been review*d. The PaneL is impressed by
the scope of the contingencies covered, and by the depth
of detaiL provided. It would be presumptuous of the
PaneL to criticize, or even to suggest modifications
to these Rules; inasmuch as the subjects covered are
so specialized, and the volumes have been prepared by
competent engineers with wide experience in such matters.
Mis<sion simulations will exercise these rules under the
concerned eyes of the crews. If any inconsistencies
are found, or if it becomes desirable to relax some
standards, the changes wiLL be subject to careful review
under management controls such as Configuration Control
Board procedures.
N
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14. LAUNCH PROCESSING SYSTEM
Early in the program it was recognized that the
checkout, test and launch of recurring Shuttle flights
would require a degree of automation that was new to
the space fraternity. As a result, the Launch Processing
System was developed around a computer that controls the
a
	
	 various checkout and launch functions. The software
Language for this computer was constructed so that an
engineer using the system could write the software for
the particuLar segment of the operation in which he was
interested and could then check it out to see that it
performed the functions required. These various sub-
routines jMre stored in the memory for retail during	 j
checkout (when a particular function of the launch pro-	 j
cess is rt'eeded. The integration of such interactive
programing must be carefully verified for the overall
prograr!( to work satisfactorily.
The system consists of a group of consoles, essen-
tially operating in parallel, each of which can call up
and initiate any of the routines in the computer during
the operation. The memory also includes the launch
r	 management program that controls the countdown, the
E
	
	 sequential performance of the many- subroutines. This
management software has provision for manual and auto-
matic holds, as appropriate to the conditions and time
periods leading to launch. The ability of many consoles
to have control puts a premium on practice so as to
achieve strict discipline on the part of the Launch Con-
trot Center personnel.	 It is significant that late in
the countdown the control function is restricted to
several master consoLes, under the cognizance of the
Launch Director. The PaneL feels that this con..trntrat-ton
of authority is good, in that it removes the possibility
of people-type failures due to misunderstanding or mis-
communication.
Launch Commit Criteria are an integral part of the
Launch Processing System which are interlocked in the
Launch sequence via the software program. The Shuttle is
a complex system that has man y elements arranged in a re-
dundant fashion to insure reliability. In order for man-
datory redundancy to be available -in flight, the vehicle as
Launched must be in the specified condition. To insure this
there are--after scrubbing--1,276 measurements or conditions
which are monitor4d during final Launch preparations. From
T-9 minutes to T-27 seconds their number is reduced to
1,089 which are monitored by the ground launch sequencer
which can call a "hold" if any out-of-tolerance condition
exists. During the final sequences, T-27 seconds to launch
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when the automatic redundant set r)rograms take over,,
there are only 254 automatic-hold measurements or
red-lines. These deal primarily with the propulsion
systems involving the engine, boosters and the externaL
tank and most are termed "single mandatory" measure-
ments, i.e., measurements with no redundant sensor or
data readily available. The remaining 835 parameters
are monitored but can not cause an automatic hoL.d. Prior
to T-9 minut's an y one of the 1,276 parameters can
cause a hold. Since many of these measurements present
difficuLties, we may be getting cLose to the point where
in some cases the ShuttLe is more reliable than the systems
designed to measure that reliability, and the current
Launch Commit Criteria will be hard put to cope with the
Later Shuttle's routine operationaL phases.
Better, more reliable instrumentation is a necessity
but there are also other things that can be done. For
instance, since there is insufficient time to make an
infaLLib a anaLysis of a measurement, go/no-go criteria
should be used for Late time constraints„ Prior to Launch,
there is also a finite time that a then properLy operating,
redundant subsystem could be removed from the go/no -go
system to aiLow effective concentration upon the more
crticaL issues.	 in the PaneL's discussions, we have
difficuLty realizing the effective management of over
1,200 prime measurements some of which are alternate (232)
or backup (214) measurements. With current training and
speciaL attention paid to the over 800 "must measure-
ments" there is Less concern for STS-1. As operaticnaL
Launch preparation time gets shorter, reliance must be
placed on fewer primary criteria, because the time ,e-
maining is simpLy not adequate for analysis or comparison
and decision.
The Panei's review of the prelaunch operations and
Landing operations certainly impresses upon us that"much
work and streamlining must be done before the turn-around
time initially envisioned can be accomplished. In Light
of the proposed t 'wo Launch sites, in fact, it may be more
economical and safer to procure at Least one additional
Orbiter, so as to give more time for the between-flight
processing•
r^
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15. LANDING OPERATIONS
After the rigors of reentry, any consideration of
the landing operation will seem tame by comparison. How-
ever, there are critical functions that must be done
properly. Fortunatel y, the landing is the one phase of
the Shuttle's flight that has been actually practiced in
the approach and landing tests. This series of flights
uncovered a sensitive control characteristic that resulted
in a pilot-induced oscitlation. This oscillation has
been analyzed and a control-gain filter devised to correct
the characteristic. This has been extensively simulated
and should pose no hazard for the crew.
Both' the prime--Edwards AFB--and the alternate landing
sites Northrup strip at White Sands for Abort-Once-Around
and KSC for Return-To-Launch-Site--have had the Micro-
wave Scanning Beam Landing System installed and tested.
The Length of the Edwards and Northrup strips are such
that there should be no difficulty due to brakin g or
overruns.
The ground crews that assist the astronauts from
the Shuttle after landing and secure the vehicle are
from Kennedy Space Center and have had extensive train-
ing. The ground support equipment at Edwards and Kennedy
is complete. The ground sup-:.urt equipment at Northrup
is sufficient to cover the crew egress and to safe the
vehicle from hazardous materials.
In Light of the preparations and training, the Panel
does not expect any troubLes to develop during the roll-
out and postlanding activities.
16. PAYLOADS AND GROUND OPERATIONS
The Panet's focus has been on the preparation:i for
the first manned orbital mission, STS-1 which ii,^ttudes
a minimum of what might be called payload, i.e., Aero -
dynamic Coefficient Identification Package ( ACIP), In-
duced Environmental Contamination Monitor (IECM), and
Development Flight Instrumentation (DFI). Consequently,
a safety of payloads area has received only a cursory
review during this past year. Within this curtailed
activity, however, two items have been examined: (1^`
Level I - Space Transportation System safety policy and
requirements and (2) the current status of the European
Space Agency's (Light and development Spacelab and
pallet hardware. In support of upcoming Panel activities,
this report outlines some areas we hope to review and
assess as the Shuttle system begins its orbitaL flight
test period and sets the stage for the early operational
flights.
Basic Space Transportation Operations safety policy
is to minimize NASA involvement in payload and attendant
ground s+,:pport equipment design, construction and testing_
while maintaining an acceptable tevel of safety. Thus,
payloads neither interfere with the Shuttle system it-
self (particularly the Orbiter) nor adversely affect
mission operations, Based on discussions at NASA Head-
quarters and KSC and a brief review of NASA documentation
there is no doubt that NASA has and intends to continue
to place great emphasis on payload safety. This through
both setting realistic requirements and making available
technical support for those who request it. The "Safclsy
Policy and Requirements" document, NHB 1700.7 issued by
NASA Headquarters established policy and safety require -
ments applicable to all STS payloads and their ground
support equipment (GSE). Typical implementing documenta-
tion for users is the "S-pace Transporation System Payload
Safety Guidelines Handbook" # 11123, issued by JSC.
Day:-to-day coverage is provided by the STS Payload Safety
Review Panel at JSC, established in 1977. This working
group assures that safety critical payload -subsystems are
appropriately verified, and 'provides confidence in adherence
Ito safety requirements throughout the payload community.
A major organizational change to better reflect current
and future needs was made at NASA Headquarters: The Office
of Space Transportation Operations (operational organi-
zatio 0 was established "separate from the Office of Space
Transportation System (a development organization) with -
out affecting the -genera roLes and responsibilities at
tKe NASA centers. In line with this, the existing Headquarters
l- 31M! P'A 'S
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Headquarters Reliability, Quality and Safety Office within
Space Transportation System organization Was set up so it
could support both the operational and deveLopmentat
organizations thus providing continuity between them.
An indication of program response to Panet: safety
recommendations (see Panel's Annual Report 1978) is seen
in the recent NASA and ESA agreement that during the Crew
Compartment Fit and Function ( C 2 F2) review a "safety walk-
through" will be conducted as defined in the appendix to
PL-ER-0111, dated August 12, 1980, of the "Policy and Pro
codures for Spacelab Flight Safety Engineering Walk-Around
Inspections." This safety walk-through is to be conducted
concurrently with the Crew Station Review and the Space-
tab Flight Unit C2 2. More specifically, paragraph 2.2
of this document n8tes: "This inspection Team shall con-
sist of ESA.. NASA, and ERNO members as follows:
	
NASA
	
,.SSA.	 N_
	
Co-Chairman
	
Co-Chairman
	
Co-Chairman
Systems Engineering
Crew Systems
Aerospace Safety Advisory
'	 Panel Representative
Product Assurance & Safety
During the Walk-Around Inspection, an ERNO Quality Assurance
representative will be required for recording findings to
be used in further team discussions and to determine any
future corrective actions."
At ?his point in time the payloads assigned to STS-1
and STS -2 take priority, and are described in Table I.
The Panel's payload review activity in the coming year is
expected to cover the areas noted in Table II. In addi-
tion, if the Liquid propellant Centaur vehicle is selected
as a possible upper stage propulsion unit for high-orbit
payloads the Panel will, of course, include it in its reviews.
a
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TABLE I	 PAYLOADS FOR STS-1, STS-2
a) STS-1 Mission
Aerodynamic Coefficient Identification Parkage
(ACIP) weighing 165 pounds. The ACIP experiment
consists of a self-contained package of 3 linear
accelerometers, 3 angular accelerometers, 3
rate gyros, signat conditioning and PCM equipment.
It is mounted on the Orbiter win g bolt carry
through structure near the longitudinal center
of gravity (C.G.).
The Induced Environmental Contamination Monitor
(IECM) weighing 985 pounds. The IECM is used
to measure and record (tape and photograph)
concentration Levels of gaseous and particulate
contamination in the vicinity of the pay Load
bay. Mounted on DFI (Development Flight In-
strumentation) System .Pallet.
	
(Note: Currently
not expected to f L y s )
Development Flight Instrumentation weighing
9,015 pounds. Inc Ludes pallet, sensors, cooling,
and cold plates plus wiring.
b) STS-2 Mission
Instruments (called OSTA-1 pay Load)
o MAPS (Measurement of Air Pollution from Satellites)
o SMIRR (Shutt(e MuitispectraL Infrared Radiometer)
o SIR-A (Shuttle Imaging Radar)
o FILE (Features Identification Location Experiment)
o OCE (Ocean Color Experiment)
o NOSL (Nightime and Daytime Optical Surv(;
of Lightning)
o aBT (Heflex Bioengineering Test)
Research Equipment
o DFI (Development Flight Instrumentation)
o ACIP`'(Aerodynamic Coefficient Identification
Package)
o IECM (Induced Environmenta Contamination
Monitor)'
o Solid Sorbent Sample
o Whole Ga,.s sample bottles (4)
o Support Systems for Orbiter Experiments
(OEX)
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Tape recorder
PCM system
Interface module
Power control box
Turning buffer
Control Panel
TABLE II - PANEL AREAS FOR REVIEW
Level II i III, IV
Documentation status and their implementation
regarding policy and minimum safety requirements
for payloads and ground support equipment. In-
cludes actual examples of payload safety
operations.
Discuss payload safety and safety related
responsibilities with the specific individuals
tagged as "safety responsible" parties and
hots they actually work with experimenters and
others involved in Shuttle paylcsds, e.g.,
correspondence, day-to-day contact personal
or telephone contact, periodic reviews.
Contractual aspects of payload safety.
The safety related documents that an experi-
menter is expected to provide to NASA including
how one checks the authenticity of safety
related data, ^, .g., materials compatibility,
use of explosives, electrical isolation.
KSC safety activities and assurance during
Launch preparations.
Self-contained payloads and how they are
treated from a safety viewpoint including the
implementation of November 4 Federal Register
Section # 1214.903 "Conditions of Use" sub-
part (c).
USAF/NASA payloads.
Specific actions taken if hazards are found
and what determines such actions.
39
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17. PRODUCT ENHANCEMENT SUGGESTIONS
As in any major program that spans a number of years
from concept to fruition the progress in parallel military
and commercial programs suggests different techniques and
concepts of systems and subsystems that would enhance the
safety of the space transportation system. It hms been
suggested by the Aerospace Safety advisory Panel that NASA
should initiate a major study to define an improved STS,
still based on the present overall concept, to improve
the basic system safety but also to improve the reliability
of its routine use and reduce the turnaround time between
missions. Such a study should not be limited to the
foLLowing suggestions but these appear to the Panel to
have mayor total positive impact on the usability and
ultimate safe performance of the space transportation
system.
1. Consistent Approach to Redundancy
Shuttle systems throughout, aerodynamic and engine con-
trots, thrust vector controls, environmental systems,
etc., should all be evaluated in the light of best current
practice to insure a consistent redundancy philosophy.
Such a study may suggest many major changes, all of which
should be carefully considered whatever the impact on
retrofit potential or cost and schedule. There will be
further Shuttle aircraft purchased and they should be at
the forefront of the safe ty state or' the art.
2. Thermal Protection System
It hags become apparent that Long life with repeated
exposure. to launch and reentry environments is not Likely
to be reached with the present thermal protection system.
Most -likeLy areas of improvement are probably within the
Strain Isolation Pad (SIP) system and in the concept of
gap fillers.
	 It is believed that the random composition
of material in the present SIP layer should be exchanged
for a more positively configured flexible layer.
3. Power Systems Concepts
The auxiliary power system now being used has consis-
tently demonstrated a random unreliability. This suggests
that an entirel y n.ew concept be sought. This investigation
should be more extensive than the power generation unit
itself--it should include at least:
a. All electric Orbiter.
b. Fixing or programming the nozzles in the
solid rocket boosters thus reducing power
demands to allow the removal of the
auxiliary power units.
C. Sufficient power per unit to fulfill re-
entry and return to base without degrad-
ation in control capability, even though
only one power unit was still operative.
4.	 Landing Gear
A tine failure at some time is inevitable--a multi-
wheel truck or multi-tire wheel should be designed that
W
	
	
can sustain a tire failure with only a remote potential
for a disastrous "out of control" ground loop or worse.
S.	 Performance Enhancement
Based on data from initial flight results, a pro-
gram to enhance thrust for more payload capability should
be initiated along with control system changes which
will permit major improvements in the permissible center
of gravity ranges for routine operation.
d.	 So id Propellant Element Handling
Review of ground facilities and erection systems
for assembly of the total vehicle with its tank and
booster systems revealed that early facility limitations
forced NASA into less than the best handling concepts
for the solid propellant elements that are assembled at
-the Kennedy Space Center. Interim procedures and special
care programs will suffice for early flights but major
remote storage and handling facilities should be provided
for the solid propellant elements awaitin g assemb,ty"'or
being individually prepared for assembly. Finally, a
major study i
`
s needed to design element handling systems
that minimizeor eliminate the hazard inherent in manipu-
lating segments with hoists, particutarly-in changing
segments from the horizontal to vertical position.
r
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18. AERONAUTICAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS
The Panel has continued its attention to certain
aeronautical research programs. During the pas.t year,
or;Jr activities in this area were limited to flight test
programs of certain hew or different aeronautical config-
urations. Most of the Panel's attention was directed at
the following points:
A. Shuttle Controllability--Retntry, hypersonic
control and pilot induced oscillation has been
an ongoing subject with those who flew the
lifting body vehicles as well as those involved
from NASA's aeronautical centers. Experimental
work has recently been conducted on other high
fidelity simulators to gain a further insight
into this problem.
B. HiMAT--A much higher risk project involving
remotely piloted flight operations. The
HiMAT is a very sophisticated machine, both
aerodynamically and,in its systems. The Panel
is confident that management of risks in this
program are controlled and that while there is
always a possibility of mission failure in this
type of project, successful completion is
highly probable.
C. Other Special Aeronautical Configurations
(DAST, Tilt Rotor) and modified aircraft
(F14, F16, F104-F15 Shuttle Tile Tests).
The Pane L- will continue to monitor safety aspects
of aero flight research programs.
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Herbert E. Grier, Panel Chairman
Sr. Vice President, EG&G, Inc. (Retired)
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Richard H. Battin
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Charles Sta,rk Draper Lab., Inc.
Leighton I. Davis
Lt. Gen., USAF (Retired)
Willis M. Hawkins
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Lockheed Corporation
I	 Ira Grant Hedrick
Presidential Assistant for
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Grumman Aerospace Corporation
Seymour C. Himmel
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Lewis Research Center
John L. Kuranz
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Siemens Gammasonics, Inc.
John F. McDonald
Vice President-Technical
Services
TigerAir, Inc.
John G. Stewart
Manager, Office of Planning
& Budget
Tennessee Valley Authority
Walter C. Williams, Ex-Officio Member
NASA Chief Engineer
Gilbert L. Roth, Staff Director
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NASA Headquarters
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FACT- FINDING MEETINGS
i
i
i
1980 PANEL SESSIONS
January 16 Annual	 meeting with NASA Administrator Washington,
	
DC
and NASA senior management
February 7 Testimony before the Senate Subcommittee U.S.	 Senate
on	 Science,	 Technology and Space
March 19-20 First	 Manned	 Orbital	 Flight,	 STS-1, Kennedy Space
Launch	 preparations,	 flight
	
hardware Center
checkout
	
and	 launch
	
countdown over-
view.
	
Orbiter	 102	 hardware/software
k status.
May 15-16 Shuttle program overview with
	
emphasis Johnson Space
on	 flight	 control	 system,	 structural Center
Load's,
	 avionics	 and
	 its	 validation
	
for
flight,	 ground/flight	 crew	 training,
space	 suit
	
accident,	 payloads	 and
Development
	
Flight
	 Instrumentation.
June 18-19 Rockwell	 International ' s	 implementation Rockwell	 Inter-
of	 their	 Systems	 Integration	 responsi- national	 Corp.
bilities.	 Orbiter and	 systems	 status, Downey,	 CA
Safety	 and	 R,eliabiLity.	 Solid	 Rocket
Motor	 handling.	 STS-1
	 hardware	 and
software
	
certification
	
and	 validation.
August 21-22 Space
	
Shuttle	 Main Engine,	 Solid	 Rocket Marshall	 Space
Booster,
	 External	 Tank	 and	 the Main flight
Propulsion
	
System
	
projects	 activities Center
in	 support	 of	 STS-1	 and	 later	 missions.
Range	 Safety	 and	 configuration
	
control.
MSFC's
	 support of
	
operations	 at	 KSC
and	 DFRC.
October 7-8 Status	 of	 STS-1	 flight	 hardware	 testing Kennedy Space
r Launch	 Commit	 Criteria,	 pyrotechnic Center
operations,	 range safety	 system.
SRM/SRB-handling
	
and processing at	 KSC
December 4 Discussions
	 with	 NASA	 Chief	 Engineer Washington,	 DC
concerning
	
current	 and	 projected	 STS-1
E
issues	 and	 their	 resolut-ion.
# 4NAL PAGE t
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1980 FACT-FINDING SESSIONS
BY
INDIVIDUAL PANEL MEMBERS
,
January 4	 Shuttle Safety, Reliability and Quality
Assurance Operations. Orbiter TPS,
APU status and problem resoLution.
January 30 -31 Orbiter fLight crew simulations training
and the fidelity of simuLator input/
output used at various NASA/contractor
Locations.
Ntarch 3 f:4	 Examination of the Development FLight
Instrumentation and OperationaL
FLight Instrumentation as to adequacy
of support and real-time use for
STS-1 mission.
March 31	 Observe and foLLow HiMAT test fLight,
data reduction and evaLuation of the
mission and supporting activities.
April 29-30	 Orbiter FLight crew simulations and
analytical evaluations of the
results to assure reentry stabiLity
and control.
May 13 Discussions with project managers on
their conduct of research aircraft
flight test programs to assure safety
of operations.
May 21 Orbiter-102 ThermaL Protection System
t he test program, insta^LLation and
the expected design margins.
May 29-30	 Computer, simuLation of Shuttle reentry
and applicabiLity of additional
Draper Laboratory work to the STS- 1
Orbiter f'Ligh`t trajectories.
Juty 8	 HiMAT program assessment meeting.
JuLy 9-10	 STS-1 Flight RuLes Review as part of
the Flight Readiness Review process.
RockweLL Inter-
nationaL,
Downey, CA
Johnson Space
Center
Johnson Space
Center
Dryden FLight
Research
Center
Johnson Space
Center
Washington, DC
RockweLL Inter-
national
Downey, CA
Charles Stark
Draper Labs.,
Inc.
Cambridge,- MA
Dryden FLight
Research
Center
Johnson Space
Center
4	 y
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STS-1 Launch Commit CriteriaL review
as a part of the Flight Readiness
Review process.
Space Shuttle Main Engine status,
problems and their resolution.
Orbiter-102 reentry stability and control
characteristics and the adequacy of the
Orbiter flight controL system, both
hardware and software. Development
and use of control equations.
STS-1 flight controL simulation equations
and r entry training resuLts for the
0.9 
	
M o<6 region.
DFRC risk management system for their
research aircraft projects, results of
flight test to date on Orbiter-102
the system configurations, general
support of the Space Shuttle System
with emphasis on STS-1.
STS-1 Orbiter reentry kinematics and
adequacy of current trajectory
analyses.
STS-1 Rollout/Stack meeting prior to
move of Orbiter-402 from its processing
facility and stacking (mating) with
External Tank and Solid Rocket Booster
in the VAB. Part of the Flight Readiness
Review process.
Update on research aircraft projects,
STS-1 support operations and review of
current flight control simulations.
STS-1 Orbiter reentry fLight controL
discussions to resoLve any remaining
concerns on stabi_Lity and control
margins.
JuLy 22-23
JuLy 23
August 6-7
September 16
September
17-18
November 13
November 13
November 17
November
24-25
Kennedy Space
Center
Rocketdyne Corp.
CaLifornia
Systems Technology
Hawthorne, CA
Dryden FLight
Research Center
Johnson Space
Center	 i
Dryden Flight
Research
Center
CharLes Stark
Draper Labs.
Cambridge, MA
Kennedy Space
Center
Dryden FLight
Research
Center
Johnson Space
Center
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APPENDIX C
INVENTORY (TYPICAL) OF
PANEL ISSUES AND CONCERNS
TYPICAL ISSUES AND CONCERNS - STS-1
SUBJECT
	
DESCRIPTION
	
STATUS
Space Shuttle Main Use of	 Flight Acceleration
	
Safety Open
Engine	 (SSME) Cut-Off System	 (FASCOS)	 to protect Panel	 will	 re-
against turbopump failures.	 Must view program
not get
	 into position
	
where	 instru- actions
mentation failure produce 3n SSME
functional	 failure.
Orbiter APU Auxiliary Power Unit	 (APU)	 fuel Closed
isolation
	
value
	
seal	 breakage due Panel	 satisfied
to pressure
	
surges	 in	 the	 fuel with program
line. astions
Orbiter TPS Completion of Combined
	
Loads Open
Operational
	
Tests	 (CLOT's)
	
uilL Panel	 will	 re-
provide	 certification	 of	 total view test	 results
the	 system and gap fillers	 to
meet expected environment.
Orbiter	 Umbilical Possible	 ice	 impact	 on	 these Closed
Doors doors during
	 List-off	 and ascent Actions	 planned
portion
	 of	 mission. taken	 appear
adequate.
Mission Operations/ Assurance that	 system	 safety Closed
Payload Safety associated with	 the Shuttle	 pay- Panel	 wilL	 monitor
Loads	 and their
	
interface	 with this as	 a	 normal
the	 Orbiter	 are	 as	 rigorous as part	 of	 its	 re-
that accomplished
	
for each view	 system
Shuttle element.
Mission
	
Simulations Assure that	 adequate time and Closed
and	 crew training thoroughness	 has been provided Activities	 to
to ground and flight	 crews to date	 give	 this
meet the demands for
	
STS-1. assurance
Orbiter entry Combinations of
	
Loss	 of roll or Closed
stability	 and yaw thrusters	 coup Led with	 in- Panel	 will con-
control	 (aero- effectiveness of aerodynamic tinue	 to	 rev'ie.w
performance) flight	 control
	
surfaces during program actions
the Mach
	
No, -6 to 0.9	 regime may
cause diverging
	
instability.
4
Flight Rules and
Flight Test Re-
quirements and
Launch Commit
Criteria
Panel review of the Flight rules,	 Closed
requirements and their application
	
Activities to
during flight, including: "policy	 date give this
prio,vity" established to govern	 assurance
downmoding in case of etectricat
50
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SUBJECT DESCRIPTION STATUS
and	 hydraulic	 limitations;	 data
available
	
for posit	 flight	 analysis
for	 various	 flight	 termination points
in the mission;	 LCC	 scrubdown.
Orbiter	 Seat Ejection	 seat yawing	 after ejection Closed
Ejection System and	 the	 Lateral	 Loads	 on	 the	 crew Tests and
when the drogue chute	 is opened. analyses	 appear
satisfactory
Launch Processing Validation/testing	 of	 the	 ground Open
System MPS)	 at and	 flight	 software	 in	 flight-con- Current	 testing
KSC	 for
	
STS-1 figuration	 using	 (as	 close	 as and	 the	 Flight
possible)
	
fLight-confi g ured	 hard- Readiness firing
wares will	 complete
this.	 Panel
monitor
TYPICAL ISSUES AND CONCERNS	 G
SHUTTLE OPERATIOW, MISSIONS AND
ORBITER VEHICLES BEYOND ORBITER-102
SUBJECT
	
D" SCRIPTION
	
STATUS
A formal enhancement
should be established to
assure proper attention
tn all those items/activities
proposed to increase use-
fullness of the STS.
Examples are:
- Orbiter Landing Gear.
Panel suggests that the
main gear configuration
be studied to assure
adequacy for maximum
required payloads, and
use of wheel RPM in lieu
of weight-on-wheels to
initiate the anti-skid
system.
- 
Orbiter TP5. Continue
to loo,% for alternate,
Less fragile materials
for tile. Alternative
SIP materials to enhance
the structural capability
of the overall system and
Less negative impact from
environmental conditions,
e.g., water.
Current processing methods
provide an acceptable level
of safety. Completion of the
ongoing SRM Hazard Study in
the spring of 1981 will define
an y problems-and confirm or
redirect KSC actions now being
planned and/or implemented.
T•hre- open items of concern
to the Panel are:
_- Analysis of the effects
of cracked propellants
on the burn rate and
subsequent V gB' over-pres-
surization.
Assurance that risks will
be reduced to lowest
Shuttle Product Improvement
or Enhancement Program
Solid Rocket Motor and
Booster Processing at
Kennedy Space Center
Actions are
in process.
Panel will
monitor as a
p art of its
normal reviews.
a
SRM Hazard Study
is in process
ECD is May 1981.
Coff funding is
being requested
and initial work
has begun on the
new storage and
handling fa-
cilities.	 Panel
will continue
to monitor this
work.
i  
practical level during
STS )perations.
- Use of breakover fixtures
vs. the current crane
and hooks handling methods.
Additionally, the decision to
continue to use manned cranes
in the VAB rather than remote
operated cranes as envisioned
for the new SRB handling and
storage facilities should be
reevaluated in light of the
results of the SRM Hazard
Study.
F
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